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ABSTRACT
Critics have said that affirmative action is at best ineffective
and at worst counterproductive. In particular, it has been argued that if
affirmative action helps anybody, it helps only the highly educated cream
of the minority population, and may perversely work to the detriment of the
unskilled and uneducated. This study finds that minority males earn higher
wages in sectors where affirmative action is prevalent, indicating that it
has increased the demand for minority males. I also find evidence of this
effect for both the lowly and highly educated, suggesting that affirmative
action under the Executive Order has not contributed to the economic bifur—







There have now been five studies of the impact of affirmative action on
employment at the establishment level.All agree that the growth of black
male employment share is higher among federal contractors, which are
subject to affirmative action, than among non-contractors. Four of these
studies find the ratio of black to white employmentamong males has also
increased.' Yet it is not unusual to hear public officials claim that affirma-
tive acton has been ineffective.
There have now been five studies of the impact of affirmative action on
occupational upgrading at the establishment level.Four agree that black
males were not employed in significantly higher occupationsamong contrac-
tors compared to non-contractors before 1974. The fifth argues that with
more stringent enforcement and a greater supply of skilled blacks in the
late 1970s, affirmative action did contribute to the occupatonal upgrading of
black males in the late 1970s.2 Yet it is not unusual to hear two mutually
contradictory criticisms of affirmative action. The first is that if it works,
it only helps blacks get low level unskilled jobs. The second, which hits
most proponents of affirmative action right between the eyes, is that affir-
mative action only helps the highly educated cream of the black population,
and perversely hurts low skill blacks. To the delight of speech-makers of
all stripes, the debate has been able to proceed largely without the hin-
drance of evidence.
Let's look at some evidence.
I.Model
In the following sections Ishall look for evidence that affirmative
action has shifted the demand curve for minority males by examining cross-
section evidence on wages. Does this make sense?If labor is perfectly2
mobile, or if affirmative action pressure is everywhere the same relative to
supply, then the answer is clearly no.In the first case, workers will move
across cities to equilibrate wages and presumably equalize real wages. In
the second, there is no cross-sectional variation in affirmative action, so no
hope of capturing its effect. Are we left then with only cross-sectional
studies of employment and time-series studies of wages?
Suppose labor is imperfectly immobile between cities because of a fixed
cost of obtaining information or of moving. Under this assumption, we may
expect cross-section wage estimates to tell us something about affirmative
action.In particular, since the supply of minorities relative to whites in
each city is no longer perfectly elastic, we may expect that minority wages
will increase relative to white wages, ceteris paribus, if affirmative action
pressure increases.
The design of this study then follows a straightforward pattern.
Estimate wage equations separately for whites and non-whites across major
American SMSA's. Control in the usual fashion for human capital. Attempt
to isolate SMSA and industry specific effects on earnings. Most critically,
bring some new information to bear.In this case, the new information is
contained in a count of the proportion of all employment in a given SMSA
and industry that is in federal contractor establishments. Since only feder-
al contractors are subject to affirmative action under the exective order, we
expect sectors with a high proportion of contractors to pay minorities rela-
tively more -- if labor is not perfectly mobile, and if affirmative action is
effective.3
II. The Impact of Affirmative Action on Earnings Inequality Across Races
Has affirmative action increased the demand for minority males? The
evidence in Table 1 suggests that it has. These are cross-section regres-
sions of the logarithm of wages on the proportion of employment in an in-
dividual's SMSA and industry that is in federal contractor establishments,
along with a set of other variables that control for individual characteristics
such as education and age, an indicator of city size, and a set of dicho-
tomous variables indicating which of 42 SMSA's the individual resides in.
These equations are estimated separately for non-white and white males who
were reported as employed in the May 1978 Current Population Survey.
The greater the proportion of employment in an industry in an SMSA
that is subject to affirmative action, the greater the wages of non-white
males compared to their brothers in other cities or industries. Equation 1
indicates that a ten percentage point increase in covered employment in-
creases monority male wages by 3.9%, and this is significant. Most of this
wage increase occurs within, not across, broad occupations.Equation 2
replicates equation 1 but adds a set of occupation indicators. The wage
effect is hardly changed. This suggests that to the extent that affirmative
action has led to occupational advancement for minorities, as has been
reported in other work, a major part of this promotion occurs within broad
occupational categories.If affirmative action's only impact were to jump
minorities into higher level broad occupations, then we would expect the
coefficient on proportion contractor to be positive in equation 1, but zero in
equation 2. The near identity of coefficients across equations suggests that
relatively little of the positive impact of affirmative action on minority wages
has been due to promotions across broad occupational categories.
The impact of affirmative action on minority male wages must be judged4
by comparing it with the impact on white males. In particular, the federal
contractor industries might be high wage industries for reasons that have
nothing to do with affirmative action. The estimates for white males in
Table 1 (equations 3 and 4) show strong indications of this industry effect:
white males' wages are also higher in contractor intensive sectors than in
sectors with relatively few contractors.If we take the impact of proportion
contractor on white males as a measure of the industry effect, then the
difference between the impact on non-whites and whites gives us a measure
of the true impact of affirmative action on non-whites correcting for the
industry effect. A ten percentage point increase in employment subject to
affirmative action then results in a significant one percent increase in
non-whites wages relative to those of whites. This reduces the average 75
cents per hour wage gap between minorities and whites by more than two
percent.Small potatoes? The contribution affirmative action may have
made reducing racial inequality, and so perhaps discrimination, should be
considered in light of the historical reduction in racial inequality since
1965.In 1967 (the earliest year of available data) the median weekly earn-
ings of full-time minority males was $90, compared to $130 for white males.
In 1967 dollars, these earnings have increased by 1978 to $114.6 for non-
whites and $146.1 for whites.In other words, in constant dollars the
racial wage gap declined from $40 to $31.5, as the wage ratio increased
from 69% to 78%. During about the same period, the proportion of em-
ployment covered by affirmative action increased from zero to roughly fifty
percent. According to our estimates, this should increase minority earnings
by 5 percent relative to those of whites. Affirmative action then could
account for roughly half the reduction in the racial wage gap, or about a
third of the increase in the racial wage ratio.5
Table 1 indicates that the returns to human capital, as measured by
years of schooling age, and occupational attainment, are lover for minorities
than for whites.3 However effective affirmative action has been, a non-white
would still earn more were he white.
Comparison with Earlier Effects
Recent work on the impact of affirmative action on employment and oc-
cupational advance (Leonard, 1983) suggests that affirmative action became
mrrpffprti,pni irinni thc Iit 1 q7flfln miniht i icrrt th ctrcnnith nif
these results, arguing that they may be overstated because of the self
selection of employers into contractor status, or because of biased reporting
on EEO-1 forms.4 This paper seeks to determine the validity of such critic-
isms by stepping away from total reliance on EEO-1 forms for reported data
and by looking at wages for evidence corroborating or contradicting of a
demand shift.
The last section showed significant evidence that affirmative action
does significantly increase the wages of minority males relative to those of
white males. While firms may have an incentive to overstate minority em-
ployment in reporting to the OFCCP, no individual has the same incentive
to dissemble when reporting race, gender, or occupation. The finding that
affirmative action has significantly increased minority male wages is then
strong support for the interpretation that reported employment shifts repre-
sent real demand shifts rather than lies, or more politely - strategic report-
ing.
Similarly, if the observed employment shifts were explained by the
self-selection into contractor status of minority intensive firms, we would
not expect to find higher wages for minorities.6
Given a sceptical nature, one might of course still question the wage
results. Perhaps the coefficient on proportion contractor is picking up the
effect of some omitted variable. The impact on white males suggests there
is at least an element of truth to this, although it is difficult to think of an
industry specific effect that increases minority wages more than those of
whites. The effect I interpret as an affirmative action effect is strongly
correlated with an industry effect - adding industry dummies substantially
reduces the impact of proportion contractor on relative racial wages - - often
to insignificance, perhaps because there is little independent variation left
in the measure of proportion contractor by industry by SMSA once both
industry and SMSA are otherwise controlled for.
Another approach to judging the strength of the wage results for 1978
is to compare them with similar estimates for an earlier year: 1973. Since
most employment estimates and historical anecedotes suggest a weaker affir-
matve acton program, we expect to observe a smaller wage effect in the
earlier year. The best test of course would take us back before affirmative
action as we know it was instituted in 1965, but appropriate cross section
data is simply not available that far back.
Table 2 replicates the specification of Table 1 for 1973, with the ex-
ception of not controlling for central city residence, which was not avail-
able.In general, the estimates are roughly similar across years.For
non-whites the estimated coefficient on proportion contractor increases as
we would expect, but not significantly, from .36 to .39 over the years. For
whites the increase from .21 to .29 is significant.Since the impact on
non-whites is greater than that on whites in 1973, and more so than in
1978, these results suggest that affirmative action may have had a slightly
greater impact in the earlier period. This is more consistent with the large7
employment effects estimated by Heckman and Wolpin than with the smaller
effects reported by Goldstein and Smith. An alternative interpretation is
that the industry specific effects have become stronger (judging by the
impact on white males) but that labor supply is approaching the new post-
affirmative action equilibrium. Recall that if labor is perfectly mobile across
sectors, a cross-section analysis of wages cannot reveal a demand shift and
we are thrown back to time series analysis.
In regressions not shown here, similar estimates are made for 1969.It
is rPssLJririn that th rrn,tr'rtrr ffrt Ic incit,nifirnt fnr' jhitc mc in -...- .
1969, but significant for non-white males. This may perhaps reflect a pe-
culiar omitted variable bias in the wage equations that differentially affects
blacks and that has grown since 1969. Alternatively these wage equations
considered together may indicate an affirmative action program that since
1969 has helped reduce racial wage inequality.
Ill. Race or Class: Has Affirmative Action Hurt Low Skill Blacks?
Even if you were a strong proponent of affirmative action, you might
stop dead in your tracks at the news that affirmative action helps only the
cream of the minority population and, with the perversity one might come to
expect from government intervention in competitive markets, has actually
hurt those most in need of help -- low skilled blacks. That is the argu-
ment advanced by Finis Welch, although he means both Title VII and affirma-
tive action under the Executive Order rolled together with similar programs
when he says affirmative action." The argument may have merit on the
margin in the case of Title VII, if an employer must choose between
potential hiring and promotion/discharge litigation.And it is certainly8
tempting to resort to such a split effect argument in trying to reconcile
effective government anti-bias programs with conflicting evidence of a
degradation in the earnings and employment of unskilled blacks.Is there
empirical support for this bifurcation argument in the case of affirmative
action proper?
To shed some light on this issue, I estimate the impact of affirmative
action on wages by race as a function of the level of education. In other
words, I augment the previous specification by adding the interaction of
proportion contractor with years of schooling and its square. Th results
are presented in Table 3 for 1978 and in Table 4 for 1973. Consider 1978
first. There is no evidence here to support the bifurcation argument. For
non-whites the interaction terms are of marginal significance at best, and
indicate a stronger, not weaker, impact of affirmative action on those with
little education.If anything, affirmative action has reduced racial wage
inequality more among the lowly than the highly educated. Among college
graduates, these cross-sections suggest no narrowing of racial inequality --
perhaps because of greater mobility among highly educated workers. Not
only does affirmative action appear to reduce racial wage inequality in
general, it also appears to reduce inequality among non-whites across edu-
cation level by pushing the lowly educated more than the highly educated --
just the opposite of the bifurcation argument. But perhaps the true home
of the bifurcation argument is in Title VII cases.
Table 4 shows that these estimated interactions vary over time. Here
the impact on whites is U-shaped while that on non-whites rises as part of
the bifurcation argument requires. However, the interaction terms are only
significant in the case of whites. For non-whites we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the impact of affirmative action depends not at all on the9
level of education. Moreover, we cannot reject the stability of the effect of
affirmative action on non-whites between 1973 and 1978, though the estimat-
ed effect does change significantly for whites. Again, there is no signifi-
cant evidence here that affirmative action has hurt lowly educated blacks.
It still increases their wages relative to whites.
IV. Conclusion
This paper presents evidence that brings us to two main conclusions.
First, affirmative action under the Executive Order program does appear to
have increased the demand for minority males relative to white males, judg-
ing from the relatively higher wages paid minority than white males in cities
and industries with many federal contractors subject to affirmative action.
Second, affirmative action under the Executive Order program does not ap-
pear to have contributed to the bifurcation of the non-white community.
Affirmative action appears to increase the demand for lowly educated minor-
ity males as well as for the high educated.10
NOTES
1.Burman (1973), Ashenfelter and Heckman (1976), Heckman and Wolpin
(1976), and Leonard (1973) all find that black males' share of male and
of total employment increases faster among contractors. Goldstein and
Smith (1976) is the exception. Differences in specifications, sample,
and time period make it difficult to isolate reasons for differences in
the various estimates.
2.Of the five studies previously mentioned, only Leonard (1983) finds
evidence of occupational upgrading of black males under affirmative
action. This is attributed to more stringent enforcement and a great-
er supply of skilled blacks in the later period (1974-1980) studied.
3.Part of the racial wage disparity has been attributed to residential
segregation rather than employment discrimination (Straszheim, Price
and Mills). However, in this sample the picture is not so clear.
There is no significant evidence here that minority men suffer a wage
loss from living in the central city -- although, peculiarly, whites do.
4.For careful and provocative discussion of these issues, see the recent
and important work by Smith and Welch (1983).11
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12Table 1: The Impact of Affirmative Action on Male Wages, 1978
Group: Non-Whites Whites
Equation: 1 2 3 4
Percent Contractor.392 .387 .290 .302
(.069) (.068) (.023) (.023)
Education .016 .030 .042 .046
(.019) (.019) (.009) (.009)
Education2 .0015 .00054 .00054 -.00017
(.0O08) (.0008) (.0003) (.0003)
Age .055 .051 .073 .066
(.006) (.006) (.002) (.002)
Age2
-. 00059 -.00055 -.00079 -.00079
(.00008) (.00008) (.00003) (.00003)
Central City
-.0022 -.0027 -.084 -.078
(.030) (.029) (.011) (.011)
City Size -.107 -.091 .103 .118
(.114) (.113) (.051) (.049)
Married .087 .086 .167 .151
(.029) (.028) (.012) (.012)
Veteran .036 .029 .024 .026
(.030) (.030) (.011) (.011)
Privately
-.053 -.047 .056 .062
Employed (.040) (.039) (.018) (.018)
Professional .206 .235
(.048) (.017)
Manager - .129 .239
(.051) (.017)







R2 .359 .382 .442 .469
N 1034 1034 7378 7378
M.S.E. .152 .147 .167 .160
Mean of the 1.306 1.306 1.491 1.491
Dependent
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. AM equations include dichotomous
variabtes for 41 SMSAs.15
Table 2: The Impact of Affirmative Action on Male Wages, 1973
Group: Non-White White
Equation: i 2 3 4
Percent Contractor .361 .365 .208 .213
(.071) (.072) (.023) (.023)
Education .059 .067 .029 .029
(.021) (.022) (.008) (.008)
Education2 - .0009 - .0016 .0010 .00055
(.0009) (.0009) (.0003) (.0003)
Age .049 .044 .072 .066
(.007 (.007) (.0020 (.002)
Age2 - .00053 - .00048 - .00078 -. 00071
(.00008) (.00008) (.00003) (.00003)
CitySize .416 .446 .181 .224
(.172) (.170) (.056) (.055)
Married .120 .105 .209 .187
(.033) (.033) (.012) (.012)
Veteran .007 -.001 .032 .029
(.032) (.032) (.011) (.010)
Privately Employed - .099 -.103 .035 .032
(.045) (.045) (.018) (.018)
Professional .132 - .198
(.067) (.018)








R2 .307 .329 .403 .430
N 1004 1004 8440 8440
M.S.E. .182 .187 .184 .176
Mean of the 1.314 1.314 1.506 1.506
Dependent16
Table 3: Bifurcating Blacks, The Impact of Affirmative Action on Male
Wages by Education Level, 1978
In Wage
a Percent Contractor
Years of Schooling Non-Whites White
Completed 1 2 3 4
8 .53 .50 .33 .34
10 .52 .49 .31 .31
12 .47 .45 .29. .29
14 .37 .38 .28 .29
16 .24 .27 .28 .29
Note: These are estimated on samples of 1034 Non-Whites and 7378 Whites,
controlling for all the variables in Table 1 with the addition of
interaction terms between percent contractor and education and
its square.
Columns 2 and 4 also include 5 dichotomous variables for occupa-
tion.17
Table 4: Bifurcating Blacks, The Impact of Affirmative Action on Male
Wages by Education Level, 1973
8 In Wage
8 Percent Contractor
Years of School Non-White White
Completed 1 2 3 4
8 .32 .32 .27 .27
10 .34 .35 .19 .18
12 .36 .37 .15 .15
14 .39 .39 .17 .17
16 .41 .41 .23 .25
Note: These are estimated on samples of 1004 Non-Whites and 8440
Whites, controlling for all the variables in Table 2, with the
addition of interaction terms between percent contractor and
education and its square.
Columns 2 and 4 also include 5 dichotomous variables for occupa-
tion.